How Joonas Donskoi Punched Sharks’ Ticket to West Final

On Wednesday, May 8th, 2019, Joonas Donskoi scored to put his San Jose Sharks up 3-1 over the Colorado Avalanche in game seven of the second round, an insurance goal that would eventually be the game-winner. There was just over seven minutes left in the second period of a 2-1 game, still very much up for grabs. This whole sequence comes off of what would normally be perceived to be the safe play, a term I’ve grown to hate over the last few years as I’ve subscribed to the idea that in hockey, safe is death. This is part of a larger piece I’ve yet to write (probably more of a summer off-season topic), but the premise is that over time, making the plays that are considered safe tend to result in a net-negative. Anyway, here’s what happened in this particular example:

Colorado defenseman Nikita Zadorov collects the puck in the defensive zone corner. He has time and space as his nearest forechecker, Gustav Nyquist (14), is a few strides away, while being held up by Carl Soderberg (34). He has a pass option to his D-partner, Patrik Nemeth (12), who’s a few strides away from Logan Couture (39). Now, Zadorov can either try to skate it out with Soderberg up the strong-side wall, skate it around the back of the net, pass it to his partner, or if he really has to, dump it out. All told, the Avs are in decent shape here.

Again, if you can make a play, you should, and avoid conceding possession unless you have to. Zadorov elects to try and dump the puck out in the form of a lofted flip. Logan Couture is able to snag it out of the air, and drop it onto his tape. Turnover. All of a sudden the Avs are on defense. While certainly worse than exactly two (2) seconds ago, this isn’t the end of the world. The Avalanche have guys back and are now trying to find a check.

Couture cycles it down to Nyquist, who is engaged almost immediately by Zadorov, and is finished into the boards. Gabriel Landeskog (92) has entered the zone and picks up Melker Karlsson (68) after Soderberg follows Couture up high. This signals to Soderberg that he will pick up the centre’s duties as their forward down low. That means Soderberg will pass on Couture to Nemeth, while he is now playing as a winger, covering the points.

Nyquist has cycled the puck down low, and is picking himself up off the ice after Zadorov rode him hard into the boards. Nyquist gets up and goes to the bench. Karlsson collects the puck in the corner, and Landeskog is engaging him immediately. Nemeth guards the front of the net, as he doesn’t want to abandon his post for Couture just yet. The weakside winger, Gabriel Bourque (57), occupies space in the high slot while Soderberg takes the defenseman out of frame.

The puck eventually works its way around to Brent Burns (88), who holds the line at the left point. Burns surveys his options before the puck gets to him. From Colorado’s perspective, they have Nemeth in the corner staying inside Couture, who’s out of frame; and Gabriel Bourque challenging Burns. Here’s where it gets tricky – Landeskog has stuck with Couture; Soderberg has Vlasic; but Nikita Zadorov, who hasn’t had a great shift so far, hasn’t picked up Joonas Donskoi (27, top right) off the bench. Donskoi has just come on for Gustav Nyquist. Here, Zadorov and Landeskog both think Karlsson is their guy. This ultimately comes down to coaching: do the Avs want their weakside D to always cover the front of the net? Or should the centre stay with his guy when he enters that ice and the D stick with the other forward? Again, this is all because Nyquist changed and was forgotten.

Burns makes an unbelievable read and banks a pass off the corner boards for Donskoi to skate onto. Landeskog recognizes he’s the closest to the puck, and he passes off Karlsson to Zadorov, for real this time.

As it turned out, that extra second it took for Zadorov and Landeskog to figure out their coverage bought Donskoi enough time to build speed and beat his check around the back of the net, with him getting a good shot off low-blocker that beats Philipp Grubauer.

Nyquist changing after getting hammered by Zadorov allowed the defense to forget about him momentarily. His replacement was therefore able to come in with a little speed and get open, before using that extra step on his check to create a quality scoring chance. The chance was successful, and ended up being the game-winner for the Sharks.

How Defensive Miscues Resulted in a Series-Clinching Overtime Goal

On Tuesday, May 7th, 2019, the St.Louis Blues hosted the Dallas Stars in a decisive seventh game of their second round match-up. This game would span five periods, with one goal each being scored in the first period, and nothing more in regulation. The first overtime period came up empty, however the second iteration of overtime proved fruitful. Patrick Maroon, the hometown boy, scored at 5:50 to punch the ticket to the Western Conference Finals for the Blues.

So, how did that goal happen? Essentially, the goal came off a few defensive miscues from the Stars off a face-off. Let’s dig deeper:

Here’s the setup. We have on offensive zone face-off for St.Louis, and they’ve sent out Tyler Bozak’s (21) line, which is flanked by Robert Thomas (18) and Patrick Maroon (7). Out of frame, we have their defensemen who never enter the picture. Dallas has sent out Roope Hintz (24) to take the face-off, with Justin Dowling (37) and Jason Dickinson (16) on his wings, and Miro Heiskanen (4) with John Klingberg (3) on D. Both of their setups are fairly standard in the NHL. Maroon and Thomas have switched wings to both be open for shots for St.Louis, while Dallas has both wingers on the inside hashmarks, one D on the outside hashmarks, and one D in front of the net. Basic stuff.

Each of these players have assignments coming off this draw. Klingberg covers Maroon, Heiskanen covers Thomas, Hintz has Bozak, and the two wingers cover the points. Again, simple stuff. Here’s what happens once the puck is dropped. Bozak and Hintz scramble the draw. The strong-side winger for Dallas, in this case Jason Dickinson, will take a route “through the back” off the face-off circle and towards the strong-side D-man. The reason behind this is so that he’s always in the shooting lane for his guy, as opposed to if he lined up on the boards. When this player cuts through the back though, he’s also supposed to pick up any scrambled draws for an easy zone exit. However, this puck jumped out toward Patrick Maroon, who bumps it back for Robert Thomas, who was coming in for the loose puck.

Now, instead of going for the puck here, Dickinson realizes St.Louis has won full possession off the draw. He decides to pass off Thomas, the puck carrier, to the D while he takes his point man. Thomas should be Heiskanen’s man, who’s still in front of the net, although he’s mirroring Thomas, while Klingberg should have Maroon. However, Klingberg either panics or switches to a zone-defense coverage. He leaves Maroon and tries to jump Thomas here. There’s nothing wrong with Klingberg doing this, but he has to be able to trust his D-partner to pick up Maroon behind him.

The only problem with this is that Klingberg gets straight-up beat by a forehand-backhand by Thomas, and Heiskanen has only now realized that he’s nowhere near his responsibility. Hintz took Bozak to the net and tied up his stick well – Bozak never gets more than two or three feet away from the big Finnish center after the puck is dropped. However, the rookie defenseman has inexplicably taken to Bozak momentarily as well. He takes a few hard strides out at an attacking Thomas, who now has an open passing option in Patrick Maroon.

Thomas shoots it, a dragging-wrister that beats goalie Ben Bishop, but not the post. Heiskanen has attempted to disrupt the shot by getting stick-on-puck here, Hintz continues to tie-up Bozak, and Klingberg attempts to get back into the play.

Klingberg gets beat to the net by Maroon, doing nothing to tie up his stick while getting caught puck-watching. Maroon bangs in the rebound, and just like that, Dallas’ season is over and their summer has begun.

Taking Risks and Dynamic Defending

On Friday, May 4th, 2019, David Pastrnak scored a highlight-reel goal that gave the Boston Bruins a 3-1 lead in a game over the Columbus Blue Jackets, which they’d eventually go on to win 4-3. For Boston, winning meant gaining a 3-2 lead in the series, with two chances to close the deal over Columbus. Needless to say, this goal was huge.

With under 9 minutes to go in the third period of a game in which they’re trailing, the Blue Jackets had been pouring on the pressure in an attempt to knot the game at twos. Nick Foligno receives a stretch pass up at the opposing blue line. He has help coming, but he may be able to gain a step on the nearest defender towards the net.

The Columbus Captain gains that step, and sees a lane to take the puck to the net himself. If you can do that at any point in the game, you take it. His other options are a drop pass to a heavily guarded Boone Jenner, or a pass to Cam Atkinson in the slot, who may actually have room to get a shot off.

Foligno is able to get a shot on net from in tight, and almost ties the game. Entering the frame is a pouncing Seth Jones, who saw an opportunity to jump for a chance. David Pastrnak failed to properly shoulder-check upon entering the zone, which would’ve allowed him to pick up the open attacker.

The rebound comes out and Jones thinks he can get a stick on it, hopefully for another shot. However, Brad Marchand was able to pick it up and is turning the puck up ice.

Pastrnak, after missing his check on the rush against, has picked up a pass from Marchand and now is away with four Blue Jackets caught deep in the offensive zone.

Scott Harrington has just come on the ice and was not able to gap up against the onslaughting Bruins forwards. They get to take a run at him at nearly full speed while he just glides back, waiting for them to catch up with him. In a way, he’s already done like dinner.

Take a look at this overhead angle. Pastrnak is able to walk right into the hashmarks unobstructed. At the Czech winger’s release point of his shot, Harrington has just begun to slide in an attempt to take away the passing lane. His slide direction is almost directly back towards his own goalie. This is as close as anyone got to Pastrnak before he fired in a wrister off the near post and in, and this is from a dangerous area.

In hockey, conventional wisdom for defensemen while defending a two-on-one has always been to take away the pass, and allow the goalie to take the shooter. The problem with this strategy is it allows too many dangerous shooters to walk into dangerous areas and have an open look at the net. In this day and age, taking away the pass is not enough anymore. Now, defensemen must at least apply pressure while taking away the pass as well. The most effective way to do this is to slide directly at the puck carrier. You should time it so that your armpit is headed straight for the puck. Here’s what that looks like, with Drew Doughty exemplifying this move perfectly.

After turning the puck over at his own blue line, Doughty makes an aggressive slide at Andrew Cogliano, the puck carrier. He takes away his time and space, and gets his armpit right at the puck. “He had speed coming down the wall and they kind of had one guy in the middle and one guy wide and I decided to take an attacking slide at him. If you slide kind of straight back then you’re gonna get got, but if you kind of slide at him, you give him no option but to move the puck and usually it hits you,” Doughty said. “You kind of establish right off the bat whether or not the guy with the puck is a shooter or a passer, and then from there on out you’re just kind of trying to bait him into making the pass and at the same time never letting the pass through, so really you’re just trying to give them the shot and let your goalie do the job and not make it tougher on the goalie. If you can bait them into the pass, then you intercept it.”

Doughty highlights another key part of defending against odd-man rushes that isn’t apparent in the clip above, and would have been useful for Harrington. This rush only materializes at the near blue line, but if it had manifested earlier, Doughty would’ve had to be more dynamic in his approach. Instead of slowing down and allowing the opposition to come at you with speed, which can be like jumping onto a moving train, you should take an ‘S’ route. This would allow the opposing forwards to eventually catch up to you, while you can at least maintain your speed. As Doughty says, you challenge the shooter to bait him into making the pass, and go back to cover the open man. And once you get into the high-danger areas of the ice, between the top of the circle and the hashmarks, you slide right at him, taking away his time and space.

How to Stop the 1-3-1 Power Play

Much has been made of the 1-3-1 power play formation, about how if it is executed correctly with the proper personnel, it can be damn-near impossible to stop. This has been the case with teams such as the Washington Capitals and Tampa Bay Lightning, who each employ shot threats all over the ice. I’ve written about how these power plays work briefly here, within the context of the Toronto Maple Leafs. Regardless, here’s a quick breakdown:

1 player at the top of the ice – usually a D-man

3 players in a line across the face-off circles, usually one passer and two shooters

1 player in front of the net

Now, the idea is to take away time and space while not getting beat by a pass. That might seem counterintuitive, as it requires a contrasting blend of conservative and aggressive styles. These power plays often elect a designated passer, or essentially a quarterback. The team works hard to get him the puck, so that he can snap it onto someone else’s tape. He’s the straw that stirs the drink. To kill this power play, you will have to identify who that is on the other team. Nicklas Backstrom, Claude Giroux, Mitch Marner. So you take away his time and space. This is what that looks like.

You, F1 that is, take a route up and out pressuring their D-man and forcing him to get rid of the puck while staying in his shooting lane until he does, at which point you get in between this half-wall quarterback and his point-man, who’s his relief valve once he gets pressured. Now apply passive pressure, funneling him toward the corner. Your goal is to block that direct pass to the D-man, or in the worst case be able to chase down a bank up the boards. This is known as a Czech Press. While staying in that passing lane, force him to do something – you’re not giving him the time and space for that perfect pass to open up. Head on a swivel, active stick.

Next, the other forward, F2, will go no higher than the top of the circles. Your job is to stay in between their quarterback and their biggest shot threat at the opposite circle. Alex Ovechkin, Steven Stamkos, Patrik Laine. You also need to be as close to their high slot guy as possible, ideally right on him and hopefully no more than a stick length away. If this slot player tries to draw you out of that east-west passing lane, prioritize the passing lane and just stay between him and the net if he goes up high, or if he drops down low, another player should be able to jump him if the puck gets to him. Now, here’s what that looks like.

In the event that F1 chases their setup man low and the puck finds its way back to the top of the zone, F2 will replace him taking the same route up at the D-man, since he’s closer to the shooting lane, and in that passing lane as F1 originally went, while F1 will retreat to the high slot and man the duties of F2. In terms deployment, these forwards should be two things: smart and quick. They must have the defensive instincts to stay within their respective passing lanes and at the very least get a touch on the puck if that pass is made. They also need to be quick enough to force the other team and replace each other when necessary. Head on a swivel, active stick.

That leaves us with two defensemen. These players will almost mirror each other. As our strong-side D-man, you will do a similar job as F2, however you’re staying between the puck and the net while the setup man has it, while trying to stay as close as possible to their net-front guy. Take away the shooting lane and discourage the shot. If he does shoot it, you need to be able to block it. This player will have a harder time getting the perfect shot off, since F1 is hounding him and forcing him to a weaker shooting angle. If he’s forced to a sharp enough angle, say, lower than the top of the circle on the boards, let the goalie take the shot and just take away the direct pass to the net-front guy by tying up his stick. Our weak-side D-man will also try to stay as close as possible to that same net-front guy, but will always stay between their opposite-circle triggerman and the net. Your main goal is to just take away his shooting lane, and block it if he tries to shoot it through you, but ideally you get stick-on-puck or stick-on-stick on this guy. You can afford to cut down more on his angle, as he’s your first priority. Here’s what that looks like now.

This is a wedge +1 formation. The quarterback is being pressured from up high toward the corner, the direct pass to the point is taken away, the ideal cross-seam pass is neutralized, the two guys in the slot have a guy right on them, and taking the shot risks having it blocked and going the other way for an odd-man rush against. His two safest plays are to rim it around the back and hope one of his guys gets to it first, or a bank pass to the point, who is the only guy without someone in his kitchen. That’s by design. Shots from the point go in somewhere around 2% of the time, and you can allow the other team to take their chances with that.

In the event that there is a loose puck, every killer on the ice needs to make a quick read. Are we able to be the first to the puck? If so, be an option. Most often, loose pucks are coming off of a rebound, a dump in, or our F1 has forced their half-wall player to bobble the puck. This puts the majority of loose pucks in the corner or at least low in the zone. If we can be first on it, we need to provide that player with support to ensure we get that puck out and down the ice. Here’s what that looks like.

We have one guy collecting the puck, one guy covering the front of the net, one guy in the slot, and one guy on the hashmarks. If the first guy on the puck has a lane to shoot it all he way down the ice, he should do so. If he can’t, he now has three quick, short passing options. Either up to the hashmarks, a reverse behind the net (which the netfront defender should be able to get to), or a pass to the player covering the slot if all other options are taken away.

If we aren’t winning the race to the puck, you still need to pressure them and collapse. However, the difference here is the killers are trying to isolate the opposition by taking away his options. Heads on a swivel are an absolute must. Our one guy on the puck should be trying to pin their puck carrier. If he gets the puck stopped, we need two guys in. The guy on the hashmarks will drop down into the battle and try to win the puck and get it down the ice, while we still have two players occupying high danger areas. Generally speaking, any time we see an attacking player bobble the puck, miss a pass, or otherwise turn their back to us, we should be taking that opportunity to apply pressure from our closest killer and try to out-will them for the puck. If the other team is able to maintain possession, we get back into our structure as quickly as possible. If a shot makes it through, we need to have all four players collapse onto the net, clearing away and boxing out opposing players in an attempt to collect that rebound and send it down the ice as well.

Since the mainstream inception of the 1-3-1 in the NHL, teams have realized how useful and effective it can be. What makes it so effective is the fact that it forces the penalty killers to choose which players to defend. This penalty killing structure mitigates the effectiveness of each option, while simultaneously prioritizing the most dangerous options. No penalty kill will ever operate at a 100% success rate, however I believe this is the most effective way to limit scoring chances against on the PK. All told, here’s a great example of the Philadelphia Flyers shutting down the Washington Capitals’ power play using this method.

An Innovative Way to Make Toronto’s Power Play Even More Dangerous

In 2018-19, the Toronto Maple Leafs were a top-ten team on the power play in goals-for per hour (GF/60), sitting ninth while scoring at a clip of 7.73 GF/60. For context, the Tampa Bay Lightning led the NHL in this category potting 10.89 GF/60. Toronto also led the league in expected goals-for per hour (xGF/60), creating quality chances at a rate of 9.25 xGF/60. While these numbers look good on the surface, I’d wager this team is capable of even greater heights. That’s really bad news for the rest of the NHL.

If it ain’t broke don’t fix it is a common trope that may be applicable to the Leafs’ power play. However, I’m of the opinion that teams are always looking to get better, as they should, and that no team should ever be satisfied. Teams scout each other more than ever now, and special teams are certainly no exception. With this in mind, it would behoove Toronto to provide two different looks with the man advantage. A drastic change to one of the league’s most dangerous power plays is not out of the question.

Nearly every team in the NHL uses at least some version of a 1-3-1 or Umbrella power play formation. For the uninitiated, this places one player, usually a defenceman, at the point in the middle of the ice; one player on each of the flanks; one player in the slot; and one player net-front. Toronto’s PP1 essentially ran this setup all year, featuring Morgan Rielly manning the blue line, Mitch Marner and Auston Matthews at the flanks, Nazem Kadri (and Andreas Johnsson following Kadri’s playoff suspension) in the slot, and John Tavares providing a screen for the goalie.

For anyone watching, their plan was quite simple: get the puck to Mitch Marner. From there, Marner’s primary read was the cross-seam pass to Matthews, who’d hopefully get a shot off. If that was taken away, Marner would often dish the puck up to Rielly, who could walk the blue line, dish it to one of the flanks, or shoot it. Marner would occasionally elect to take the shot, which would hopefully create a rebound for either Tavares, Kadri, or Matthews. Early in the season, that cross-seam pass was open and the Leafs took advantage. Teams eventually took notice, and blocking that cross-seam feed to 34 became a priority. Matthews scored just 5 powerplay goals in 2019, a four month span in which he played 43 games and saw 110:37 of PP TOI.

The problem with this plan is that none of the three players at the top of the umbrella are one-timer threats. Matthews, a lefty on the left side, has an elite catch-and-release, however that still requires an extra second for the killers to apply pressure, and the goalie to get set. Rielly, another lefty, rarely elected to take a shot from up high, and when he did, it usually came in the form of a light sifter hoping for a tip. And with all due respect to Marner, who is an elite playmaker, his shot is not at the level where the opposing defence needs to respect it.

So, how can Toronto score more on the powerplay? What I’m proposing would be a radical change to the current system, and would go against the grain and challenge conventional wisdom in the NHL. I’m advocating for the Toronto Maple Leafs to use a behind-the-net powerplay formation.

How does that work? Well, I won’t pretend to be the creator behind this idea, as it’s one I’ve seen gain traction among some of the smarter hockey minds on Twitter, yet not a setup we’ve seen employed in an NHL game. The Maple Leafs have the talent and personnel to pull it off. Shots following passes that originate from behind the net have a 12.8% success rate, a number I’d bet would only go up when removing a defender.

Essentially, you need two passers, two shooters, and a net-front guy. Depending on the game situation, you could have two different looks. Here’s one option I’d go with.

This is a safer option as it utilizes Rielly at the top, which would help to prevent shorthanded goals and odd-man rushes against.

You start by getting the puck to your passers. In this scenario, I have Mitch Marner and William Nylander as the dishers, setting up below the goal line on opposite sides of the ice. Both players are right-handed shots and are interchangeable. Ideally, you have one righty and one lefty, with the lefty setting up on Marner’s side, but having one guy on his natural wing in this position isn’t the end of the world. Once the team gets set up, Marner and Nylander will play catch behind the net. Both are in relatively low-danger areas that most penalty kills would not apply pressure. This gives them time to look for openings. Aside from passing back and forth, they are both looking to set up John Tavares in front of the net for a tap-in, or to either of the high shooters.

The main advantage of this formation is that it gets the opposition looking the wrong way. Nylander and Marner handling the puck below the goal line will force the penalty killers, and perhaps most importantly, the goalie, to turn their heads toward them. As they attempt to try and stay inside the three other Leafs, they will assuredly be forced to turn their backs to them, which allows the shooters to move around looking for a passing lane to open up. If the opposition chooses to play up high and take away your two shooters, great. You now have a 3v2 down low. If the killers play aggressive and challenge your two passers, that only leaves two players up high to defend your two shooters and your net-front guy. In the event that the puck does get to one of your shooters, let’s say 44 for argument’s sake, 91 will stand square in front to provide a screen, 34 opens up for a one-timer, 16 steps out for a backdoor pass, and 29 provides an outlet if all other options are taken away. Here’s another setup this team could use.

A more radical, offence-first option, 5 forwards are on the ice for when you’re trailing and need a goal. I actually prefer this as 29 and 34 have probably the two best shots on the team.

This option is even more radical, as you’ll notice all five of these players are forwards, which means you don’t have a defenceman on the ice. You may give up more shorthanded goals, but you’ll also score more. This look has two elite shots up high in Auston Matthews and William Nylander, while Kadri can play in traffic. Marner is still a disher down low, while Tavares joins him. It helps to have Tavares there as he’s a lefty, which gives him a better angle to bank passes off the boards to Marner, and allows him to walk out on his forehand. Having Nylander up high instead of Rielly helps too, as he’s a righty that can open up for a one-timer when the puck gets to Matthews.

In essence, this formation is something I believe would make the Toronto Maple Leafs better, yet not a change I can see Mike Babcock making in the near future. For better or for worse, Babcock has shown he’s one of the more stubborn coaches in the league, although with proper evidence to try something, he can be convinced. The Leafs have been at the forefront of analytic, research, and sport science in the NHL sphere, and this change is one I could see them eventually exploring.